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EDITOR'S NOTE - The foll'owing article is a revision of the dedicatory address on May 11, 1974,
when the aquatics laboratory at Bemidji (Minnesota) State University was opened formally and named
in honor of Dr. Harold T. Peters, Professor Emeritus of Biology at that institution. Dr. Peters, a
member of the Bemidji faculty since 1945, had previously served as chairman of the Division of
Science and Mathematics there and also had been president of the Minnesota Academy of Science in
1957-1958.

'T. C. MITS' and the Utility of Science
ABSTRACT - The general public, as well as many leaders of our society tend to view science as
descriptive and to value science mainly for "practical" applications. Although technological implications are important, science cannot legitimately be considered primarily descriptive. Science is a
creative activity, involving human judgment, and can most fruitfully be thought of as metaphor or
play. The practical value of science, of the liberal arts in general, and of academe is that they provide
the playful approach to experience which is a necessary basis for successful planning and action, and
which makes us human.

EVAN B. HAZARD*

When a college opens a new science building, it proudly
invites T. C. Mits in for a look. I first learned of T. C. Mits as
an acronym for The Common Man In The Street in Simon
( 1973). (I have since found that his liberated companion,
T. C. Wits, prefers to retain her maiden name. She has, however, graciously assented to my use of masculine pronouns
and acronyms in a generic sense.) Having T . C. Milson campus
to look at us provides me an excuse for a look at what we are
doing in academe, using aquatic biology as a start, but going
on to the natural sciences in general, and then to the other
liberal arts. I will be selective, and will emphasize certain
basic aspects of our calling which are generally neglected or
belittled outside of academe, and which it has lately become
fashionable to neglect within academe as well.
What might T. C. Mits see college faculty and students
studying in aquatic biology and related environmental studies?
Faculty and students are following the movements of walleyes with radio-tracking equipment, studying the growth
rates of known year-classes of perch, developing new methods
of determining the age of walleyes, analyzing well water to
determine its usability, measuring the concentration of mercury and other heavy metals in game fishes, studying the
effects on stream water quality of the fertilization of commercial wild rice paddies, evaluating the influence of snowmobiles on vegetation and wildlife, and so on.
These are important activities, deliberately described in
terms that perhaps first come to the mind ofT. C. Mits when
he is thinking favorable thoughts about the sciences. Perhaps
his feelings and those of many businessmen, legislators, and
government officials, as well as of some academicians, can be
summed up in the following widely quoted words:
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'The most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being
able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of
these laws."
Some ways of applying knowledge are too obvious. As
soon as the radio-tracking studies were publicized, we began
to receive calls asking where the fish were. On a somewhat
higher plane, knowledge that we gain in limnology, biochemistry, physiology, heavy metals research, and so on may
be of real long term practical benefit. We may learn more
about the movement of walleyes, and thus about the best
ways in which to manage walleye populations for sustained
yield harvesting. We may learn how to avoid eating excess
methyl mercury in contaminated fish, or better still, how to
reduce the contamination. And, in carrying out such studies,
students acquire the facts and the skills to be of service to
society in solving such problems elsewhere, and in teaching
others the scientific approach to answering questions.
The practical application of science is important, and I
wish in no way to belittle it. However, as I have described
it, it is as much technology as it is basic science. Without
being too analytical, perhaps we can consider technology as a
collection of methods for getting jobs done, and science as a
system of rules and behavior patterns for trying to explain
observations within a certain rational context, for making
rational sense out of the universe. The two are today often
closely related, but this is not a logical necessity. If there
were no deliberate attempt to do science, there would still be
technology. Damascus steel was forged with no understanding
of modern chemistry, medieval armies catapulted projectiles
into walled cities with no knowledge of dynamics, Luther
Burbank bred super vegetables without understanding genetics; and although we have known of Newton's law of gravitation for almost 300 years, we still make no use of it in predicting tides over IO years in Coos Bay, Oregon.
Scientific understanding often makes technology develop
faster, but in principle and often in practice, you can operate
effectively without knowing what you are doing. And society
primarily values science for its technological usefulness, not
for its exploratory value. In fact, T . C. Mits would often
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rather not understand. I think we should keep this in mind
when we think about society's support for science. Many
people believe that American society supported basic science
heavily in the 1960's. Actually, "the fact is that it never
supported basic science on a large scale - as basic science"
(Simon, 1973) . Most nations support the sciences primarily
in hopes of solving technical problems - in health, military
capacity, space exploration, energy development, and so on .
In the last few years, as budgets have gotten tighter, the
emphasis on short-term, supposedly practical, results has
increased. Purse-string holders have become more reluctant
to realize that , in the long run, basic science done solely for
its explanatory value will also produce information of potential practical benefit. Most of us could cite many examples to
prove that this is true , but it would be pointless. As Edward
Edelson, science editor for the New York Daily News, points
out, "the very attempt is a mistake. You cannot justify
science on practical grounds any more than you can justify
music or art or literature. ff you must start pleading practical
benefits - that the symphony increases productivity or that
painting is good interior decorating or that the novel uplifts
morals - you have lost the argument before it begins"
(Edelson, 1974). Therefore, despite the fact that the application of science is where the money comes from, let us dwell
on the nature of basic science, partly because it is more fun,
but also because it will take us full circle.
Alternative approaches

First, some ground rules. Scientists, insofar as they are
effective scientists, are rational. They of course have no
monopoly on reason, nor are they reasonable in all things.
But they believe that, in order to understand their observations, they must reason. Linnaeus ( 1758) said "it is the exclusive property of man to contemplate and to reason on the
great book of nature . She gradually unfolds herself to him
who, with patience and perseverance, will search into her
mysteries." (We will ignore any male supremacist implications at this time. Ou !side of his scientific endeavors, Linnaeus
was as capable of unreason as the next person.) This ground
rule is an article of faith . So is a second ground rule : "the
universe is orderly." (Neither of these articles of faith rules
out other sorts of faith among scientists.) There is no logical
necessity that the universe be orderly. Even if it is, there isno
assurance that people are capable of fully understanding the
order that is there. But scientists think the universe is orderly,
and in principle comprehensible, largely because this approach
is so fruitful. The success of the scientific approach to the
study of things has them pretty much convinced that the
universe is all of a piece. Most of them find this exciting and
awe-inspiring. The apparent orderliness of the universe in
fact moved Einstein to observe that "the most incomprehensible fact is that nature is comprehensible" (Weisskopf, I 972).
Many people, including most scientists, see the order in the
universe and the potential ability of man to understand it as
a good thing. Others do not see it that way at all.
In order to consider a few of the reasons why some people
find basic science congenial and some people do not, we
should look carefully at the nature of scientific understanding. T. C . Mils thinks science is basically a collection of infonnation about nature, a description of the universe. Most
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college professors outside the sciences probably agree with
him, and so do some scientists. These people see science as
objective, which it is, and also as automatic, which it is not.
They thin,k that the scientist carefully collects measurable
data, divides the sum by pi times the natural logarithm of
Avogadro's number, and mechanically produces a description
of that part of the universe from which the data were gathered .
The more data, and the more precise the measurement , the
better the description. It is understandable that some people,
seeing scientists as cataloguers and calculators, find science
unattractive . Wordsworth ( 1800), al though he does not use
the word science, is obviously talking about us when he
writes:
"Physician art thou? one all eyes,
Philosopher! a fingering slave,
One that would peep and botanize
Upon his mother's grave?"
This view of science, as a description of nature, is unattractive because science then seems to be devoid of human
judgment. But, as many of us see it, this mechanical view of
science is false (Bronowski, 1965; Miller, 1970). I say this
for two reasons. The first is that a completely mechanical
description is as impossible (and would be as useless) in
science as it is in painting or poetry. Cezanne and Wyeth
both decide what to include in a painting and how to include
it, and even Canaletto chooses his colors and his composition.
Ansel Adams chooses his composition, perspective, lighting,
and exposure. Are the known "facts" of science automatic
descriptions? Hardly. Nobody has ever watched Mars do a
full turn around the sun; aJJ we have is a series of points on
charts. Kepler 's conclusion that the orbit of Mars is an ellipse
is a human judgment. The points on the charts do not simply
generate an ellipse - they can be made to fit other curves ,
and they do not fit an ellipse exactly. Johannes Kepler and
his successors have had to make judgments about observational errors and the disturbing effects of other planets in
order to conclude that Mars, and by inference all the other
planets, travel in ellipses. Or, rather, that they would if the
other bodies were not there. But they are there. Yet we,
reasonably, still persist in saying that Mars travels in an ellipse
about the sun.
The same process occurs in biology, and all the sciences.
Gregor Mendel, in the second generation of his fifth experiment with garden peas , obtained 428 plants with green pods
and 152 plants with yellow pods (Hardin, 1966). This is not
a 3 : 1 ratio, but a 2.82: I ratio. (Three significant figures is
enough to make my point.) In Mendel's judgment, this and
similar experiments, none of which gave exactly a 3: I ratio,
justified the statement that a certain set of conditions results
in a 3: I ratio. The 3: I Mendelian ratio is not a description of
nature, but a judgment about what is important in nature and
what is not. It has meaning, whereas the mere data do not.
And even the mere data themselves are a judgment, because
Mendel decided that for a particular chosen purpose, it was
best to ignore those plants that died, any insignificant differences in the greenness of green pods, the time of flowering,
and what not. Decided, chosen, purpose, best, insignificant
are not neutral, mechanical words . There are differences be-
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tween the sciences and the arts, but absence of person al
judgment is not one of them.

Science as metaphor
The second reason that science cannot legitimately be
seen as mechanical description goes deeper. Klopfer (1974)
argues that the objectives of the sciences, the arts, literature,
philosophy, and theology are basically the same , "to find
new ways of perceiving the universe ." (Note: He did not say
the methods were indistinguishable .) Let us now look at what
some non-scientists think about their way of perception .
John Ciardi, a poet, had this to say in 1964:
"I do not deal in ideas but in experiences. I must make
illusions for you. I must make something happen, and
it must be as if it is happening to you . Every as if experience you try on is another way of seeing yourselves.
I must lead you to feel as if you were a child , a lover,
a murderer , a dancer, a coward . For only as you try on
all your possibilities vicariously can you come to know
yourself.
" But you will not be able to try them on if I only
tell you about them .... I must make you feel them
as if they were happening to you. And to do that, f
must play my games.
"I am not even sure .... that I play my games for
you at all. I th ink l would play them if I were the last
man alive. If I am in any way your benefactor, the
benefaction is an accident. I play the games that let me
write poems because [ find that writing the poem is a
better way of living than not writing it. Because I an1
happiest when I find myself winning a hard game with
myself" (Ciardi , 1954).
The poet uses metaphor to evoke images, to convey meaning. He plays with words . Theologians also are interested in
finding meaning in experience. Some , like Frederick Buechner
( 1973) and David Miller ( 1970), find in play the route to
greater understanding in theology . To Buechner the Lord's
Supper is deeply meaningful , yet he says this of it: "It is
make believe . . .. It is a game you play because he said to
play it. 'Do this in remembrance of me .' Do this. Play that it
makes a difference . Play that it makes sense . If it seems a
childish thing to do, do it in remembrance that you are a
child ." Miller devotes his book Gods and Games to the development of a theology of metaphor, of "as if," of play. And
he reminds us that this view of the Kingdom is not a new
one: "Unless you receive the kingdom of God like a child,
you cannot enter into it." (This is Miller's wording , and is
presumably either Mark 10: IS or the comparable passage in
Luke. It is not the wording of either KJ or RSV.)
But, one might ask, what has this to do with science ? The
answer is everything. The profound insights of science are
metaphor - "as if' - let's pretend." Any abstraction is pretense, and the scientist must abstract in order to understand .
The scientist is a model buil.der. The physicist does not consider his atom with its electron clouds as reality , but as a
fruitful picture of reality. The uniform rectilinear motion of
Newton cannot occur in the real world, but it is the basis for
a theory that , within limits, successfully relates the motions
of apples, moons, space probes, and even comet Kohoutek .
(Comet Kohoutek may not have been as bright as we would
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like, but neither are we . But it followed precisely the predicted path, and it will be back. Just wait.) This theory, by
the way, says objects behave "as if' there were an attractive
force proportional to their masses and inversely proportional
to the square of the distance between them, and which allows
you to calculate "as if' the entire mass of a body were located at the center of the body, which of course it is not.
The entire science of population genetics is likewise based
on a principle , the Hardy-Weinberg Law, which only holds
true under conditions that never occur in nature. But this
playing around allows us to predict the way real populations
will behave with the passage of time . And these predictions
come true, as anyone knows who has tried to kill flies with
DDT in recent years. It turns out that the most informative
way to express what happens in the genetics of populations
is in terms of abstractions or metaphors, not raw facts . The
population geneticist will thus happily state with a straight
face that the gene pool of a Mendelian population of houseflies has deviated from a Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium because
an alteration in the ecosystem has changed the set-point . The
housefly, being less interested in abstractions, is happy if it
can deviate from the path of a flyswatter.
I have said that the insights of science , like those of the
arts and humanities, are basically metaphor , or model-building, and are thus in essence playful. In our work-oriented
society, I fear most people would equate playful with "trivial ."
Quite the opposite - play is essential. As the psychologist
Erik Erikson (1963) has put it, "child's play is the infantile
fonn of the human ability to deal with experience by creating
model situations and to master reality by experiment and
planning.'' The playful, metaphorical approach to experience ,
then , is the creative, uniquely human approach, and it is
basically the same in the poet's retreat, the artist's studio,
and the chemist 's laboratory. And this is what, to my oldfashioned way of thinking, a college, and the liberal arts, are
al l about. In the words of Miller ( 1970), "the university is
where the action is not ; it is where the imagination is - the
imagination for all action. Or so we would hope! It is the
playground of ideas of play . And such play is serious business!
It is the basis for whatever and wherever the action is."

The utility of science
And it is Davi d Miller, of course, who has brought us full
circle. It is the impractical , seriously playful pursuit of the
sciences, the arts, and the humanities for their own sake which
can give us the understanding which can be the only sound
basis for responsible action in the everyday world of T. C.
Mits. And it is imperative that T . C . Mils understand that
world if he is to survive in it and prosper in it. It is not
enough that the scientist understand ; T. C . Mits must understand , too . If he understands nature , he may love her. If he
does not , he will use her and such use, of course , is mis-use.
Misuse is rape, and can only lead to ruin, both of nature and
of T . C. Mits. Speaking of the defense of nature, Sigurd Olson
once said (in an address on our campus) "only if there is
understanding can there be reverence, and only where there
is deep emotional feeling is anyone willing to do battle."
T . C. Mits will not defend what he does not comprehend.
One reason that T. C. Mits and his leaders often do not
trust the arts and sciences, and are therefore suspicious of a
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liberal education, is that they do not want to understand.
Understanding is heady stuff - it is risky and frightening . It
often shows us that the usual way of doing things is shortsighted and even absurd. Because of this, T. C. Mits would
often rather restrict the writer and musician to the production
of TV commercials, and the scientist to the designing of
better fish finders.
What we consider practical, in the end, depends on how
we view man. If we think that all T. C. Mils needs is a full
belly and a dry basement, the liberal arts are unnecessary and
even dangerous. But these are not all he needs. To be fully
human, he needs to participate in that playful, metaphorical
understanding of himself and his world of which only humans
are capable. This means he needs a liberal education in the
sciences, the arts, and the humanities. Society must support
the impractical liberal arts for the very practical reason that
they serve uniquely human needs. Chairman Mao Tse-Tung
was therefore being impractical in I 972 when he said:
"Marxist philosophy holds that the most important
problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the
objective world and thus being able to explain it, but
in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to
change the world."
He, as well as others who adhere to any of the several
existing rigid ideologies, might have added that a knowledge
of the laws of the objective world might lead to the overthrow
of the ideology itself, which is not the kind of change he had
in mind .
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